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We assess the impact of compensation based incentives together with monitoring 
mechanisms on investment related agency costs. The results indicate that well 
structured compensation based incentives significantly reduce agency costs. Managerial 
firm based wealth delta has a significant, negative effect on agency costs for firms in all 
size categories. The significance of managerial firm based wealth vega in reducing 
agency costs is concentrated in small firms, suggesting that vega exposure is more 
effective where risk is higher. The significance of cash compensation in reducing 
agency costs is concentrated in the large firms. This result implies that higher cash 
compensation reduces agency costs by allowing risk-averse managers the opportunity to 
diversify outside the firm.  
Keywords: corporate governance, executives compensation, risk incentives, delta, 
vega. 
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1. Introduction 
This study provides evidence that well structured compensation based incentives 
significantly reduce investment related agency costs. The potential conflict of interest 
between shareholders and professional managers in large publicly traded corporations is 
a major issue in the study of corporate governance. Rooted in the separation of power 
between the shareholders that own the firm and the managers that control the firm’s 
assets, this well known agency conflict arises from fundamental differences in the 
positions of shareholders and managers. Whereas shareholders are in a position to 
readily diversify their wealth, managers typically have most of their human capital tied 
up in the firm and often hold a large proportion of their financial wealth within the firm 
as well (Fama, 1980;  Stulz and Smith, 1985). This principal-agent conflict gives rise to 
agency costs that lead to the sub-optimal use of a firm’s resources. Under-diversified, 
risk-averse managers have an incentive to reduce their personal exposure by 
undertaking investments that reduce firm risk or by foregoing risky positive net present 
value projects at the expense of shareholders in the form of reduced wealth creation. As 
Jensen (1986) has noted, this problem is likely to be acute in firms with low growth 
opportunities and high free cash flow.  
The conventional remedy for this conflict is to align managerial interests with 
those of shareholders by tying the manager’s compensation to firm value or firm 
performance (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Option based compensation is well 
suited to this end because the convex payout profile of stock options can offset the 
concavity in the manager’s utility function. In practice, the use of option based 
compensation has been increasingly employed since the latter part of twentieth century 
(Murphy, 1999 and Brockman, et al., 2010). For example, Murphy (1999) observes that 
stock options have become the largest single component of compensation over the last 
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fifteen years and Hall et al. (2002) note that stock options constitute the single largest 
part of the compensation packages of US CEOs. Similarly, Conyon et al. (2011) find 
that during the period 1997-2003 the importance of salaries in total compensation has 
declined for UK CEOs, while bonuses and equity related pay, such as options have 
become more important. As discussed in the following section, there is a long and 
growing literature examining the determinants and incentive effects of managerial 
compensation on agency costs. Surprisingly, despite this and the growing use of stock 
and stock option compensation, there has been no attempt in the literature to measure 
investment related agency costs directly and test if and how they are impacted by option 
based compensation incentives.  
This paper addresses this gap by first explicitly measuring the investment related 
agency costs on a broad sample of UK firms, and then assessing if and how managerial 
compensation based incentives affects them. A UK sample is of particular interest 
because prior UK studies have documented that internal corporate governance 
monitoring mechanisms, such as board structure, are not effective in reducing agency 
costs (e.g. Goergen and Rennebog, 2001). In the absence of effective internal 
monitoring mechanisms, compensation based incentives offer themselves as a credible 
alternative. They have the potential to mitigate suboptimal managerial behaviour and, 
hence, to reduce agency costs. To test this argument, we employ two analytical 
parameters of option-based compensation risk-taking incentives, namely delta and vega. 
Delta measures the sensitivity of the manager’s firm based wealth to the firm’s stock 
price while vega captures the manager’s firm based wealth sensitivity to the firm’s stock 
return volatility.1 
                                                          
1 The delta of outright share ownership is 1 and the vega is 0. The delta and vega of cash are both  equal 
to 0. The delta and vega of managerial total firm based wealth are weighted averages of the deltas and 
4 
 
Another important feature of this paper is that it recognizes that firm size can 
affect the effectiveness of compensation incentives on managerial behaviour. It is 
generally held that due to greater complexity and difficulty in monitoring, managerial 
actions are less observable in large firms (Doukas, et al., 2005; McKnight and Weir, 
2009). Where managerial actions are less observable, managers could utilise this cover 
to pursue conservative corporate policies at the expense of shareholders. In this kind of 
environment compensation based incentives could be very effective in mitigating the 
agency conflict. Managers in small firms do not have this cover, but the agency conflict 
is exacerbated by the financial vulnerability of small firms due to their limited access to 
human and financial resources (e.g. Titman and Wessels, 1988). Thus, if larger firms are 
conducive to covering managerial actions and smaller firms are more financially fragile, 
the effect of compensation incentives may vary across the large-small environment.   
In the main contribution of this paper the results show that managerial 
compensation incentives do have a significant effect on investment related agency costs, 
and that the effects do vary with respect to large and small firms. Managerial wealth 
delta is significantly, negatively related to agency costs for both large and small firms. 
This suggests that managerial compensation packages with high sensitivity to the firm 
stock price reduce agency costs. The results also show that cash compensation is 
significantly, negatively related to agency costs for large firms but not small ones. This 
is consistent with Guay’s (1999) argument that higher cash compensation reduces 
agency costs by affording risk-averse managers in large firms the opportunity to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
vegas of the individual shareholdings and options: ∑=
i
ii deltaxdelta  ∑=
i
ii vegaxvega , where i 
refers to the individual shareholdings and options and ix  is the proportion of asset i in total firm based 
wealth. For example, consider a manager with 50% of his wealth in shares and 50% in an option with a 
delta of 0.5. The delta of his portfolio will be equal to 75.05.05.015.0 =×+× .  
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diversify outside the firm. Finally, managerial wealth vega significantly reduces agency 
costs in small firms but not in large ones, suggesting that vega exposure is more 
effective where risk is higher. 
 
2. Previous related work 
 Jensen (1986) argues that firms with free cash flow and low growth prospects 
are prone to agency costs. Within the free cash flow hypothesis, it is generally assumed 
that managers pursue self interest at the expense of shareholders. As such, the presence 
of cash flow in excess of that required to finance new value investments creates the 
potential for those funds to be wasted (Richardson, 2006). There is evidence in the 
compensation literature that managerial compensation incentives affect corporate policy 
by aligning the managers’ interests with those of the shareholders (Guay, 1999; Knopf, 
et al., 2002; Coles, et al., 2006; Brockman, et al., 2010). The implication is that the 
compensation incentives reduce agency costs. This compensation literature has used one 
form or another of three variables to capture managerial compensation incentives: Delta, 
vega, and cash compensation.   
2.1 Delta and agency costs 
Coles, et al. (2006) highlight that delta may serve to align the interests of 
shareholders and managers by providing management with incentives to work harder or 
more effectively in order to share gains/losses with shareholders. Therefore, a negative 
relationship would be expected between delta and agency costs. Alternatively, Chava 
and Purnanandam (2010) argue that the incentive to share gains with shareholders 
imposes a cost on management.  This cost is inherent in the form of increased exposure 
to the firm’s total risk, which would be of concern to an undiversified risk-averse 
manager, as a manager’s wealth is typically concentrated in the firm.  Furthermore, 
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managerial human capital is closely associated with firm performance (Fama, 1980;  
Smith and Stulz, 1985; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010). Therefore, managers with 
higher delta exposure would be expected to favour low risk corporate policies and 
disregard risky positive net present value projects, thus leading to acute agency 
problems.  
Belghitar and Clark (2014) have shown that the relationship between delta and 
risk taking depends on whether the CEO’s utility function has increasing, decreasing, or 
constant absolute risk aversion.2 A negative relationship implies decreasing absolute 
risk aversion. Thus, for managers with decreasing absolute risk aversion delta is 
negatively related to investment related agency costs. Similarly for managers with 
increasing absolute risk aversion delta is positively related to investment related agency 
costs and there is no delta effect for managers with constant absolute risk aversion. 
Most studies either implicitly or explicitly assume decreasing absolute risk aversion, 
which leads to our first hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between delta and investment 
related agency costs. 
2.2 Vega and agency costs 
Belghitar and Clark (2014) have shown that, like delta, the effect of vega on 
managerial behavior depends on whether the manager has decreasing, increasing or 
constant absolute risk aversion. The reason for this is that vega is positive (see for 
                                                          
2 Risk aversion means that each manager has a utility function )(wu  satisfying the following conditions:  
wwuwu ∀≤′′≥′  ,0)( ,0)( , where primes denote first and second derivatives with respect to wealth, 
denoted as w. Utility functions such as these are strictly concave. Pratt (1964) showed that maximizing 
the expected utility of a risk averse economic agent is approximately equal to: 
)(
)( 
wu
wuA
′
′′
−= . DARA 
implies 0<
dw
dA
; IARA implies 0>
dw
dA
; CARA implies 0=
dw
dA
.      
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example, Hull, 2003).3 Thus, an increase in the volatility of the firm’s returns increases 
the manager’s firm based wealth. The higher the vega, the larger is the increase in 
wealth. An increase in wealth affects risk aversion depending on whether the manager 
has decreasing, increasing or constant absolute risk aversion (see footnote 2). Thus, 
under the plausible assumption that managers have DARA utility functions, higher 
levels of vega should increase the incentive of managers to reduce agency costs. 
Previous studies (Guay, 1999; Knopf, et al., 2002; Coles, et al., 2006; Brockman, et al., 
2010; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Beladi and Quijano, 2013) have found that 
managerial compensation sensitivity to stock return volatility does, in fact, encourage 
risk-taking behaviour by aligning the risk tolerance of shareholders and management. 
For example, Coles, et al. (2006) show that managers with higher values of vega take 
riskier investment decisions. In a similar vein, Beladi and Quijano (2013) find that firms 
pay higher loan rates as their CEOs have higher values of vega. The implication is that 
greater managerial incentives to engage in value maximizing risky corporate policies 
serve to reduce the costs of monitoring managerial behaviour. As such, a negative 
relationship should exist between vega and agency costs. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between vega and investment 
related agency costs. 
2.3 Direct cash compensation and agency costs 
Unlike delta and vega, managerial direct cash compensation bears no direct 
sensitivity to firm performance or firm risk. In this respect Berger, et al. (1997) suggest 
that a higher level of managerial cash compensation is indicative of managerial 
                                                          
3 Vega is the first partial derivative of the value of the option with respect to the volatility of the return on 
underlying asset. Because of the asymmetric payoff structure of an option, vega is always positive. In the 
absence of the asymmetric payoff structure, vega is equal to zero. 
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entrenchment. An entrenched, risk-averse manager could engage in policies that serve 
his interests at the expense of shareholders. Furthermore, the absence of convexity in 
cash compensation would not hinder the manager’s pursuit of conservative corporate 
policies. On the other hand, Guay (1999) and Belkhir and Boubaker (2013) argue that 
greater direct cash compensation affords managers the opportunity to diversify their 
wealth outside the firm. By being more diversified, they are more inclined to engage in 
riskier corporate policies, which would reduce the monitoring costs of ensuring that 
managerial actions are congruent with shareholder interests. As such, a negative 
relationship between direct cash compensation and agency costs could exist. 
Hypothesis 3a: There is a positive relationship between cash compensation and 
investment related agency costs. 
Hypothesis 3b: There is a negative relationship between cash compensation and 
investment related agency costs. 
3. Data and sample construction 
The data on CEO compensation and firm based wealth incentives and 
characteristics was hand-collected from BoardEx, while data on firm market value 
equity and financial statements is from Thomson Reuters Worldscope. We exclude 
financial firms from the empirical analysis because the differentiation between 
investment and finance operations is ambiguous.  The sample spans the period 2000–
2004.4 For convenience, variable definitions and sources of data are presented in Table 
1. 
                                                          
4 The sample period was dictated by the availability of homogenous data.  The period of analysis is free of 
potential distortions caused by the exceptional measures taken in the wake of the worldwide financial 
crisis of 2007. The period of analysis is also free of potential distortions in reaction to the major tax 
reform of July 1997. Bell and Jenkinson (2002) report that the effects of the tax reform on equity prices 
continued until the end of 1999, so 2000 is the first year free of the reform’s effects. 2000 is also the first 
year that Boardex reports estimations of CEO vega and delta. The passage of FAS 123R on December 12, 
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[Insert Table 1 Here] 
3.1 Main variables: agency costs, executive delta, executive vega and executive salary 
We follow Doukas, et al. (2005) and McKnight and Weir (2009) to capture 
agency costs as the interaction of firm growth opportunities and free cash flow (FCF). 
Based on Jensen (1986), agency costs are more pronounced among firms with low 
growth opportunities, relative to firms with high growth opportunities.5 To measure a 
firm’s growth opportunities we employ three measures; the market-to-book ratio 
defined as the market value of assets less the book value of assets to total assets; the q-
ratio defined as the ratio of market value of equity plus total debt to total assets; and the 
market capitalisation ratio defined as the ratio of market capitalisation to total assets. 
Using these measures of growth opportunities, we create interactive variables. The 
interactive variable is equal to FCF multiplied by an indicator (dummy) variable that 
equals 1 if a firm’s growth opportunity is less than the median of the sample and 0 
otherwise. We define FCF as operating income before depreciation minus the sum of 
taxes, interest expenses and dividends paid, standardized by total assets. This measure is 
consistent with the measure adopted by Lehn and Poulson (1989), Doukas, et al (2005) 
and McKnight and Weir (2009).  
The measures of executive compensation sensitivities are also consistent with 
prior studies (Guay, 1999; Knopf, et al., 2002; Coles, et al., 2006). CEO Delta (Vega) is 
                                                                                                                                                                          
2004 caused Boardex to modify its database for the post-2004 period. Up to 2005 Boardex reports 
compensation data using the old format (pre-FAS 123R) that uses the Black-Scholes option pricer to 
calculate the value of stock option grants. For fiscal years 2005 and later, Boardex reports compensation 
using the new format (post-FAS 123R). In the post-FAS 123R period, firms calculate and expense equity-
based compensation at fair value using their own valuation models. Thus, for the post-2004 data, Boardex 
does not calculate the Black-Scholes value of current year stock option grants, nor do they provide 
estimates of CEO vega and delta.  Instead, Boardex reports the firm‘s own calculated fair values of 
equity-based compensation, which is not comparable across firms within the same year if firms are using 
different valuation methods. Additionally, for the same firm, CEO vega and delta are not comparable pre- 
and post-FAS 123R 
5 A number of studies have provided support to Jensen’s arguments that agency costs occur mainly in 
firms with FCF and low investment opportunities (see among others Griffin et al., 2010). 
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defined as the pound change in the CEO’s personal firm based wealth with respect to a 
1% change in the stock price (stock volatility). CEO firm based wealth is measured as 
the value of all stock ownership, unexpired stock options and long term incentive plans 
(LTIPs) accumulated and held by the CEO to date 6. Finally, CEO Cash is captured 
from the annual direct cash compensation paid to the CEO in the fiscal year. All 
compensation structures are measured in the thousands of pounds. Additional data 
collected from BoardEx includes the total number and the number of independent 
directors on the board.  
3.2 Control variables 
Based on prior studies on agency costs, several control variables are included in 
the analysis. Audit Fees is measured as the natural logarithm of total audit fees for the 
fiscal year (see Griffin, et al. 2010). Board size (Bsize) measured as the natural 
logarithm of the total directors on the board. The ratio of independent directors on the 
board to total members on the board (Bindep) is employed as a proxy for board 
independence (McKnight and Weir, 2009).  The natural logarithm of total assets proxies 
for firm size (Fsize).  We also include a measure of leverage computed as the ratio of 
total debts to total assets (LEV).  Dividend (DIV) is defined as the ratio of total cash 
dividends paid to total assets. The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
current study are presented in Table 2 
                                                          
6 The delta of outright share ownership is 1 and the vega is 0. The delta and vega of managerial total firm 
based wealth are weighted averages of the deltas and vegas of the individual shareholdings and options: 
∑=
i
ii deltaxdelta  ∑=
i
ii vegaxvega , where i refers to the individual shareholdings and options 
and ix  is the proportion of asset i in total firm based wealth. For example, consider a manager with 50% 
of his wealth in shares and 50% in an option with a delta of 0.5. The delta of his portfolio will be equal to 
75.05.05.015.0 =×+× .  
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 [Insert Table 2 Here] 
CEO Delta has a mean (median) of £94,289 (£22,000).  Likewise, CEO Vega 
has a mean (median) of £23,060 thousand (£1,250).  This finding suggests that the 
average (median) CEO firm based wealth increases by £94,289 (£22,000) for a 1 
percent increase in the firm stock price. Similarly, the average (median) CEO firm 
based wealth increases by £23,060 (£1,250) for a 1 percent increase in the firm stock 
volatility. The sensitivities of UK CEO firm based wealth are lower than the ones 
reported in US studies. For example Chava et al. (2010) report an average CEO Delta 
(Vega) of $607,000 ($79,000). Table 2 also shows that UK CEOs receive on average 
(median) an annual cash compensation of £344,414 (£300,000).  Table 3 presents the 
pairwise correlation matrix of all variables to be included in the current study. The high 
correlation across the different agency costs measures suggests that they serve as good 
proxies for each other and by extension for investment related agency costs.   
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
4. Empirical results 
 Table 4 reports the results for six specifications where the dependent variable is 
a measure of agency costs and the independent variables are the CEO compensation 
incentives and the control variables described above. As stated earlier, the agency costs 
are more prone to firms with free cash flow and low firm growth opportunities.  To 
measure the agency costs, we use an interaction variable by multiplying the firm free 
cash flow with an indicator (dummy) variable that equals 1 if a firm’s growth 
opportunity is less than the median of the sample and 0 otherwise. All the independent 
variables are lagged by one period to reduce the potential of endogeneity bias. Since the 
measures of agency costs distribution are left truncated at zero, we employ truncated 
regressions. To control for industry and time heterogeneity, we include industry and 
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year dummies in the regressions. Models (1), (3) and (5) in our analysis only 
incorporate corporate governance monitoring mechanisms and firm characteristics to 
provide comparisons with earlier studies. Alternatively, models (2), (4) and (6) include 
the compensation variables.  
 [Insert Table 4 Here] 
 The coefficient of Audit Fees is significantly negative across all models 
presented in Table 4. This finding is consistent with Griffin, et al. (2010) who argue that 
in low growth firms with free cash flow, managers may have an incentive to hide 
wasteful corporate actions through manipulation of financial statements. In this regard, 
Chung, et al. (2005) show that this increases audit risk and effort expended by auditors 
to minimize the likelihood of managerial misrepresentation of financial results and 
involves higher audit fees. Therefore, higher audit fees serve to reduce FCF in firms 
with low or poor growth opportunities, and, by extension, reduce agency costs. Similar 
to Audit Fees, a significant negative relationship between Bsize and agency costs is 
reported across models (1) and (3). This is consistent with the notion that larger boards 
serve to strengthen the link between corporations and their environments, provide 
counsel and advice regarding strategic options for the firm and play a crucial role in 
creating a corporate identity, whilst also serving as a monitoring mechanism, thereby 
making larger boards more effective in reducing agency costs (Dalton, et al., 1999). 
LEV is negatively significant only in model (2).  This provides some evidence that debts 
serve as a potent mechanism to reduce the amount of free cash flow available to 
management. Fsize is documented as having a highly significant positive relationship 
with agency costs at the 1% level across all models in Table 4. This finding is consistent 
with larger firms being more complex and more difficult to monitor, thereby providing 
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managers with greater opportunities to pursue self-interest (Doukas, et al, 2005; 
McKnight and Weir, 2009).   
 Our main models (2), (4) and (6) provide significant evidence of the impact of 
managerial compensation incentives on agency costs. In models (2), (4) and (6) there is 
a significant negative relationship level between CEO Delta and agency costs. This 
finding is consistent with hypothesis 1 and the argument that the sensitivity of 
managerial wealth to changes in stock price (delta) serves to align the interests of 
managers with those of shareholders. Besides delta, models (2), (4) and (6) present 
evidence of a significant, negative relationship between CEO Cash and agency costs.  
This is consistent with the argument that higher levels of direct cash compensation 
afford the undiversified manager greater opportunity to diversify his personal wealth 
outside the firm (Guay, 1999). There is no evidence that sensitivity of managerial firm 
based wealth to stock return volatility (CEO Vega) has any significant effect on agency 
costs.7 
 
4.1 Firm size, managerial compensation sensitivities and agency costs 
As with other governance mechanisms, the effectiveness of managerial risk 
incentives may vary across firm size (Hutchinson and Gul, 2004).  According to 
McKnight and Weir (2009) large firms tend to be complex and difficult to monitor 
compared to small firms. As such, managers of large firms are more prone to pursue self 
interest corporate policies because their actions are not easily observable.   In such 
situations compensation based incentives could be very effective to curb self-interested 
managers. On the other hand, the actions of managers in small firms are easily 
                                                          
7 As a robustness test we added the managerial ownership percentage to our specification, the results 
remain qualitatively similar to results reported in Table 4. 
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observable, but the agency conflict is exacerbated by the financial vulnerability of small 
firms due to their limited access to human and financial resources (Titman and Wessels, 
1988). This suggests that larger firms are conducive to covering managerial actions and 
smaller firms are more financially fragile, the effect of compensation incentives may 
vary across the large-small environment.   
To assess the impact of managerial compensation incentives on agency costs in 
differing organisational environments due to size, we split the sample into 3 size 
categories. Firms with Fsize less (greater) than the 40th (60th) percentile of the sample 
are classified as small (large) firms.8 As in Table 4, the dependent variable is measured 
as the interaction between firm free cash flow and firm growth opportunity. The 
regression results are presented in Table 5. 9 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
In all models in Table 5 there is a significant negative relationship between CEO 
Delta and agency costs at the conventional level of significance. This is consistent with 
the results presented in Table 3 and suggests that irrespective of firm size, larger 
managerial wealth delta serves to reduce agency costs. There is also some evidence that 
CEO Vega has a negative effect on agency costs for small firms in models (2), (4) and 
(6) but not for large firms. The difference between smaller and larger firms could be due 
to more risk enhancing opportunities for smaller firms associated with their inherently 
higher riskiness documented by Titman and Wessels (1988). Finally, there is a highly 
significant, negative relationship between direct cash compensation (CEO Cash) and 
agency costs at the 1% level in large firms (models (1), (5) and (11)) but not in small 
                                                          
8 We excluded firms with firm size values between the 40th and 60th percentiles because these firms cannot 
be easily classified as either being large or small.   
9 As a robustness test, we also consider non-interacted high FCF as the dependent variable. The results, 
available on request, are qualitatively similar to those for the interacted dependent variables.  
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firms. This effect is possibly due to the fact that salaries in the larger firms are 
significantly higher than those in the smaller firms, thereby providing the opportunity 
for managers in the larger firms to more effectively diversify their wealth portfolios.  
 Interestingly, the results in Table 5 suggest that monitoring mechanisms are 
effective tools for reducing agency costs in large firms but not in the smaller ones.  In 
models (1) and (3) a significant negative relationship is presented between Audit Fees 
and agency costs at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. In all other models the 
relationship is insignificant. In model (1) Bsize has a significant, negative relationship 
with agency costs at the 5% level, while in all other regressions the coefficient of Bsize 
is insignificant. Furthermore, in model (1) there is a negative relationship between 
Bindep and agency costs at the 5% level of significance, while in all other regressions 
the coefficient is insignificant.  LEV has a significant, negative relationship with agency 
costs at the 1% level for large firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that insofar as 
managerial actions are more easily observable in smaller firms, monitoring mechanisms 
are rendered ineffective as shareholders can directly monitor managers themselves. 
Compensation incentives, however, reflected in delta and vega, are more effective in 
reducing agency costs in the smaller firms. Both delta and vega are significant for the 
smaller firms and the absolute values of their coefficients are much larger than the 
corresponding coefficients for the larger firms.  
5. Conclusion 
 This study establishes the first empirical link between managerial compensation 
and investment related agency costs. The results show that managerial compensation 
incentives do have a significant effect on agency costs. Delta has a significant, negative 
effect on agency costs for firms both large and small. However, the larger absolute 
values of the delta coefficients for small firms suggest that delta incentives are more 
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effective in reducing agency costs in the small firm environment. The significance of 
vega in reducing agency costs is concentrated in small firms. This finding suggests that 
vega exposure is more effective in the small firm environment with more risk enhancing 
opportunities. The significance of cash compensation in reducing agency costs is 
concentrated in the large firms. The implication here is that higher cash compensation 
reduces agency costs by affording risk-averse managers the opportunity to diversify 
outside the firm.  
There is also some evidence that monitoring mechanisms, such as external 
auditors, board size and board composition, are effective in reducing agency costs in 
large firms but not in small ones. This suggests that if larger firms create an 
environment where managerial actions are less observable, monitoring mechanisms 
such as board of directors, external auditors and debt represent an effective means of 
reducing agency costs. Furthermore, the insignificance of monitoring mechanisms in 
reducing agency costs in small firms is evidence for the argument that managerial 
actions are more observable in these firms and, consequently, monitoring mechanisms 
are a costly and inefficient mechanism for reducing agency costs. 
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Table 1: Variable empirical definition and data sources 
Variables 
 
Empirical definition 
 
Source 
CEO Delta 
CEO Delta is the pound change in CEO firm based 
wealth* for a 1% change in stock price, in thousands.  
* CEO firm based wealth includes all equity holdings 
(share ownership), unexpired stock and LTIPs options 
accumulated and held by the CEO to date (£, thousands).  
Boardex 
CEO Vega 
CEO Vega is the pound change in the CEO’s firm based 
wealth* for a 1% change in stock return standard 
deviation, in thousands. 
Boardex 
CEO Cash 
The sum of all cash based compensation received by the 
CEO during the year (salary, bonus, pension, and other). 
Boardex 
FCF 
Operating income before depreciation minus the sum of 
taxes, interest expenses and dividends paid, standardized 
by total assets. 
Worldscope 
MKTBV 
The ratio of book value of total assets minus the book 
value of equity plus the market value of equity to the 
book value of total assets 
Worldscope 
Q_Ratio 
The ratio of market capitalisation plus total debt divided 
by total assets. 
Worldscope 
MCAP The ratio of market capitalisation to total assets Worldscope 
Audit fees The natural logarithm of audit fees for the fiscal year Worldscope 
Bsize 
The natural logarithm of total directors on the board. 
Bindep is the ratio of total independent directors on the 
board to total directors on the board 
Boardex 
Bindep 
Bindep is the ratio of total independent directors on the 
board to total directors on the board 
Boardex 
LEV  The ratio of long-term total debt to total assets. Worldscope 
Fsize  The natural logarithm of total assets Worldscope 
DIV The ratio of total cash dividends paid to total assets Worldscope 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Variable N Mean SD  Median Min Max 
FCF 1942 0.055 0.127  0.069 0.004 0.401 
MKTBV 1894 2.071 2.612  1.447 0.421 41.053 
Q_Ratio 1942 1.683 2.585  1.081 0 40.840 
MCAP 1894 1.493 2.637  0.873 0 42.650 
CEO Delta 1541 94.289 400.952  22 0 12881 
CEO Vega 1397 23.063 160.242  1.253 0 2481.039 
CEO Cah 1504 344.414 200.650  300 5.423 1678.396 
Audit Fees 1823 6.378 1.455  6.217 1.792 14.293 
Bsize 1851 2.084 0.311  2.079 0.693 3.091 
Bindep 1851 0.437 0.159  0.429 0 0.875 
LEV 1851 0.331 0.327  0.217 0 1 
Fsize 1851 12.897 1.827  12.736 5.971 18.961 
DIV 1851 0.026 0.032  0.020 0 0.693 
FCF is measured as the operating income before depreciation minus the sum of taxes, 
interest expenses and dividends paid, standardized by total assets. MKTB is the ratio of 
book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to 
the book value of total assets. QRATIO is the ratio of market capitalisation plus total debt 
divided by total assets. MCAP is the ratio of market capitalisation to total assets. CEO 
Delta is the pound change in CEO firm based wealth for a 1% change in stock price, in 
thousands. CEO Vega is the pound change in the CEO’s option based wealth for a 1% 
change in stock return standard deviation, in thousands. CEO_Cash is measured as the sum 
of all cash based compensation received by the CEO during the year. Audit Fees is the 
natural logarithm of audit fees for the fiscal year. Bsize is the natural logarithm of total 
directors on the board. Bindep is the ratio of total independent directors on the board to 
total directors on the board. LEV is the ratio of short-term debt total debt. Fsize is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. DIV is the ratio of total cash dividends paid to total assets. 
All variables have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
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Table 3.  Correlation Matrix 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1.FCF_MKTBV 1 
           
2.FCF_QRATIO 0.901 1           
3.FCF_MCP 0.856 0.881 1          
4.CEO Delta -0.118 -0.107 -0.118 1 
        
5.CEO Vega -0.085 -0.076 -0.077 0.274 1        
6.CEO Cash -0.024 -0.015 0.016 0.201 0.379 1       
7.Audit Fees 0.118 0.120 0.153 0.081 0.246 0.679 1      
8.Bsize 0.037 0.040 0.070 0.114 0.211 0.566 0.569 1     
9.Bindep 0.003 0.006 0.031 0.038 0.102 0.294 0.304 0.072 1    
10.LEV -0.107 -0.077 -0.122 0.042 -0.025 -0.086 -0.104 -0.092 -0.103 1   
11.Fsize 0.212 0.202 0.243 0.118 0.248 0.762 0.812 0.672 0.267 -0.157 1  
12.DIV 0.083 0.082 -0.039 0.094 0.104 0.131 0.089 0.048 0.086 0.059 0.077 1. 
Values in bold are significant at the 5 % level and above. FCF_MKTB is measured as the interaction variable between free cash flow to 
total assets and market-to-book-ratio. FCF_QRATIO is measured as the interaction variable between free cash flow to total assets and Q-
ratio. FCF_MCAP is measured as interaction variable between free cash flow to total assets and market capitalization ratio. CEO Delta is 
the pound change in CEO firm based wealth for a 1% change in stock price, in thousands. CEO Vega is the pound change in the CEO’s 
option based wealth for a 1% change in stock return standard deviation, in thousands. CEO_Cash is measured as the sum of all cash based 
compensation received by the CEO during the year. Audit Fees is the natural logarithm of audit fees for the fiscal year. Bsize is the natural 
logarithm of total directors on the board. Bindep is the ratio of total independent directors on the board to total directors on the board. 
LEV is the ratio of short-term debt total debt. Fsize is the natural logarithm of total assets. DIV is the ratio of total cash dividends paid to 
total assets. 
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Table 4: Agency Costs regressed against executive compensation sensitivities, corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm characteristics. 
 FCF_MKTB FCF_QRATIO FCF_MCAP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CEO Delta  -0.064*  -0.063*  -0.064* 
  (0.080)  (0.079)  (0.076) 
CEO Vega  0.046  -0.001  0.021 
  (0.741)  (0.993)  (0.879) 
Log (CEO Cash)  -0.057**  -0.440**  -0.031* 
  (0.001)  (0.007)  (0.062) 
Audit Fees -0.007** -0.005** -0.010** -0.010** -0.012** -0.010** 
 (0.000) (0.016) (0.002) (0.019) (0.001) (0.017) 
Bsize -0.016** -0.013 -0.016** -0.008 -0.013 -0.017 
 (0.028) (0.216) (0.027) (0.440) (0.112) (0.116) 
Bindep 0.007 -0.002 0.018* 0.021 0.004 0.009 
 (0.466) (0.870) (0.083) (0.176) (0.714) (0.570) 
LEV -0.007 -0.013** -0.003 -0.003 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.128) (0.018) (0.490) (0.632) (0.772) (0.298) 
Fsize 0.008** 0.014** 0.012** 0.017** 0.013** 0.015** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
DIV -0.106** -0.044 -0.086* -0.030 0.019 0.007 
 (0.019) (0.322) (0.052) (0.517) (0.677) (0.875) 
Constant -0.030* -0.083** -0.060** -0.122** -0.051 -0.065* 
 (0.077) (0.002) (0.012) (0.001) (0.112) (0.058) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1389 986 1389 986 1389 986 
R2 12.31% 19.95% 10.21% 16.67% 12.31% 17.22% 
Agency costs are the dependent variables, and they are measured at time t. All independent variables are measured at 
time t-1.  FCF_MKTB is dependent variable in models (1) and (2) and is measured as the interaction variable between 
the free cash flow to total assets and market-to-book-ratio. FCF_QRATIO is the dependent variable for models (3) and 
(4) and is measured as the interaction variable between the free cash flow to total assets and Q-ratio. FCF_MCAP is the 
dependent variable in models (5) and (6) and is measured as interaction variable between the free cash flow to total 
assets and market capitalization ratio. For empirical definition of the independent variables see Table 1. 4-digit industry 
classifications are included in the regression The models are estimated with the tobit estimator and p-values are in 
parentheses and are robust to heteroscedasticity. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05. 
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Table 5: Agency Costs regressed against executive compensation sensitivities, corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm characteristics based on firm size. 
  FCF_MKTBV χ2 (1) FCF_QRATIO χ2 (1) FCF_MCAP χ2 (1)  
 L. Firms 
(1) 
S. Firms 
(2) 
 L. Firms 
(3) 
S. Firms 
(4) 
 L. Firms 
(5) 
S. Firms 
(6) 
 
          
CEO Delta -0.040** -0.200* 4.99*** -0.040** -0.200* 4.31** -0.040** -0.200* 5.14*** 
 (0.014) (0.078)  (0.029) (0.080)  (0.028) (0.067)  
CEO Vega -0.031 -0.502* 2.95* 0.130 -0.510* 2.07 0.094 -0.567** 3.11* 
 (0.830) (0.088)  (0.365) (0.090)  (0.955) (0.042)  
Log(CEO Cash) -0.012*** -0.090 6.20*** -0.010*** -0.041 4.01** -0.010*** -0.0521 5.34*** 
 (0.001) (0.270)  (0.001) (0.625)  (0.001) (0.641)  
Audit Fees -0.009*** 0.006  -0.007** -0.002  -0.004 -0.018  
 (0.003) (0.935)  (0.019) (0.767)  (0.224) (0.210)  
Bsize -0.035** -0.028  -0.009 -0.033  -0.024 -0.015  
 (0.028) (0.267)  (0.574) (0.190)  (0.171) (0.557)  
Bindep -0.064** 0.022  -0.041 0.039  -0.027 0.054  
 (0.019) (0.517)  (0.134) (0.245)  (0.370) (0.105)  
LEV -0.057*** -0.006  -0.036*** 0.001  -0.045*** 0.009  
 (0.000) (0.623)  (0.003) (0.902)  (0.000) (0.535)  
Fsize 0.0243*** 0.026***  0.014*** 0.025***  0.018*** 0.041***  
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001)  
DIV -0.201** 0.033  -0.223* 0.054  -0.135 0.036  
 (0.046) (0.681)  (0.053) (0.515)  (0.153) (0.647)  
Constant 0.063** 0.008  0.026 -0.121**  -0.220** -0.113  
 (0.028) (0.775)  (0.459) (0.020)  (0.009) (0.171)  
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Ind. dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
 Obs. 475 307  475 307  475 307  
R2 26.37% 23.79%  18.91% 22.04%  17.57% 21.07%  
Agency costs are the dependent variable, and they are measured at time t. All independent variables are measured at time t-1.  FCF_MKTB is 
dependent variable in models (1) and (2) and is measured as the interaction variable between the free cash flow to total assets and market-to-book-
ratio. FCF_QRATIO is the dependent variable for models (3) and (4) and is measured as the interaction variable between the free cash flow to 
total assets and Q-ratio. FCF_MCAP is the dependent variable in models (5) and (6) and is measured as interaction variable between the free cash 
flow to total assets and market capitalization ratio. For empirical definition of the independent variables see Table 1 Models (1), (3), (5) are 
regressions on a subsample of large firms, while models (2), (4) and (6) are regressions on a subsample of small firms.  4-digit industry 
classifications are included in the regression.  χ2 (1) is the test of difference between the coefficient of large sample and small sample. The results 
are based on Tobit estimator. P-values are presented in parenthesis and are robust to heteroscedasticity.  ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels of significance respectively. 
 
